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Government Borrowing
WE FIAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT that in practice the principal
sources of government funds are taxes and loans, and what-
ever portion of total expenditures is not covered by tax reve-
nues must be covered mainly by borrowing. Having analyzed
in considerable detail in several preceding chapters the prob-
lems of war taxation, we conclude by treating briefly the
problems of war borrowing.
In Chapter 4 the general economic implications of taxation
and borrowing in a program of war finance were set forth.
In Chapter 6 we discussed the factors influencing the desira-
ble amounts of taxation and of borrowing which might take
place. In terms of fundamentals, therefore, the remaining
aspects of the problem are not especially complex. An ade-
quate treatment of methods and of the many technical details
of selling government securities would require a separate
volume in itself. We merely round out our study of war
finance by discussing the more important issues involved in
a borrowing program and highlight some of the technical
aspects.
The task with which the federal government must cope
in the sale of its securities during the emergency may be
visualized by reminding the reader that the revised budget
estimates for the fiscal year 1943 contemplate total expendi-
tures of some $76 billion. In relation to this total, we enu-
merated several combinations of taxes, each of which might
be expected to raise about billion in the fiscal year
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1943. Although Congress may enact more drastic tax legisla-
tion than we have indicated, the chances are not great that
it will. Present prospects are that the federal government
will be forced to raise in the fiscal 1943, by the sale of
its securities, at least billion. The general implications
of this task constitute the theme of this chapter.
1 COMPOSITION AND OWNERSHIP OF OUTSTANDING FEDERAL
DEBT
An appropriate point of departure for a study of the borrow-
ing program is to examine the composition and distribution
of the outstanding government debt. As of June 30, 1942,
the gross public debt of the United States government, in-
cluding debt bearing no interest, was $72.4 billion.' In
addition, there were $4.6 billion of outstanding securities
guaranteed principal and interest by the government.2
The total federal debt, both direct and guaranteed, may
be grouped conveniently into three categories: special issues,
such as those sold directly to governmental agencies and trust
funds; public nonmarketable issues, such as savings and war
bonds and adjusted service bonds; and public marketable
issues.
Table 23 shows the distribution of the federal debt on
June 30,1942 among principal classes of holders. The
class'all other investors', comprising individuals,trusts,
fiduciaries, and non-financial corporations, had holdings of
about $25.7 billion, or 34 per cent of the total debt, divided
almost equally between marketable and nonmarketable
issues. The next largest category was that of commercial
banks, with total holdings of $24.9 billion, of which all ex-
cept a small fraction were marketable issues. A similar pre-
ponderance of marketable issues is shown by the smaller
totals for insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and
the Federal Reserve Banks, while about 75 per cent of the
holdings of federal agencies and trust funds was in special,
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TABLE23
Distributionby Classes of Holders of Interest-Bearing Securities
Issued or Guaranteed by the United States, as of June 30, 1942
(millions of dollars)
U. S. COy.
AGENCIES COM- INSUR- ALL TOTAL
& FEDERAL MER-MUTUAL ANCEOTHER OUT-
TRUSTRESERVECIAL SAVINGSCOM- INVES-STAND-




issues 7,888 251 39 7313,14521,395
Total 10,6022,64524,8743,8378,89525,66476,517
% of total out-
standing '4 3 32 5 12 34 100
SOURCE: Treasury Department, press release, July 2, 1942.
During the twelve months ended June 30,1942, total
holdings of 'all other investors' rose from $14.7 billion to
almost $25.7 billion. Of this gain of about $i ibillion, ap-
proximately $8.8 billion were nonmarke table issues, of which
the sale of United States Savings Bonds accounted for $5.8
billion and Treasury Tax Anticipation Notes for $3.0 bil-
lion. Commercial bank holdings gained about $5.7 billion,
from a total of $19.2 billion to $24.9 billion; holdings of
federal agencies and trust funds $2.l billion, and insurance
companies $2.0 billion.
The trend shown in the fiscal year 1942 toward relatively
greater holdings for 'all other investors' is clearly a step in
the right direction from the standpoint of inflation control.
It is equally clear, however, that one of the chief objectives
in marketing government securities during the war must be
to bring about vastly greater increases in the holdings of
such investors.
2 SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR GOVERNMENT BORROWING
In considering the sources from which the government may
borrow during the war, we must apply the test we have usedGOVERNMENT BORROWING 319
throughout this study: efficiency in diverting resources from
civilian to military use and in preventing inflation. To the
extent that the sale of government bonds curtails civilian
spending, which otherwise might compete with the gov-
ernment for the limited supply of scarce resources, the war
effort will be promoted and the danger of inflation will be
lessened.
In Chapter 6 we concluded that an aggregate of some $20
billion of funds might be borrowed by the government in
the fiscal year 1without inflationary results; also, that,
with an effective system of direct controls, considerably
larger sums might be borrowed. Thus, there is no reason
why the sale of government securities in the amount of $45
billion should necessarily cause a marked degree of inflation,
although obviously the danger of inflation will become more
serious as the amount of borrowing rises above billion
or some moderately higher level.
Our earlier analysis also demonstrated that no certainty
exists that any particular source of government borrowing
will prove inflationary or otherwise. The sale of government
bonds to a particular class of purchasers may be inflationary
under certain circumstances and• non-inflationary under
others. The test in each case is: does the transaction actually
result in a roughly equivalent curtailment of civilian spend-
ing? If it does, the increase in government spending is offset
by the decline in civilian spending, and no inflationary tend-
encies appear.If civilian spending is not curtailed, the
amount of money competing for the given supply of goods
will increase.
Nevertheless, certain sources of government borrowing are
more likely to have inflationary effects than others. We must,
therefore, analyze the principal sources in order to determine
the most desirable markets for the sale of government securi-
ties. From the standpoint of the present analysis, these sources
may be classified into three principal categories: current
savings, idle balances, and commercial bank credit.320 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
Current Savings
On the whole, the purchase of government bonds from cur-
rent savings may be considered non-inflationary and provides
therefore the most desirable source of wartime borrowing.
Accruing week by week and month by month, savings con-
stitute a recurring market for federal securities. Once an
organization is set up which can efficiently convert savings
into government securities as they accrue, it will be continu-
ously useful so long as the government is faced with deficit
financing. Obviously, the larger the amount of such funds
that can be absorbed into government bonds the less will be
the proportion of current income that may enter the
of expenditures, forcing up prices.
Current savings, for the purpose of this discussion, are
that part of the gross cash receipts of persons, business con-
cerns, and other legal entities not expended in operations
or used for consumption, and not paid out as taxes, interest,
dividends, and gifts, or withdrawn by owners of unincor-
porated enterprises. Savings as defined here include sums set
aside as reserves for depreciation or other purposes, but not
actually expended. If not held as cash balances, savings are
used either to acquire new assets, such as buildings, equip-
ment, inventories, savings bank accounts, stocks or bonds, or
to repay debts.
Sums deposited in savings accounts or paid as premiums
on life or endowment insurance policies are considered sav-
ings. A major portion of such funds, as they are paid into
savings institutions, become readily available to the govern-
ment as a market for its obligations. It may be expected that,
as the war progresses, other investments available to savings
institutions will be reduced, and that an increasing propor-
tion of their funds will be invested in government bonds.
As of June 1942, insurance companies in the United
States held $8.9 billion of federal obligations, and, during
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by slightly more than $2 billion compared with an average
annual increase of $6oo million for the five preceding years;
mutual savings banks owned some $3.8 billion of govern-
ment securities, and, during the preceding twelve months
had increased their holdings about $470 million, against an
average annual rate of $250 million for the five preceding
years.3
The dollar volume of individuals' savings tends to increase
as the national income rises. In Chapter 3 we estimated that,
in an ordinary peacetime expansion, and with no shortages
of wanted goods, the excess of total consumer incomes over
expenditures would amount to some $31billionwhen aggre-
gate money incomes reached a level of $109 billion. These
i billion represent, therefore, an estimate of what would be
available for taxes and savings, and compare with the $i8
billion that might be expected at a level of $8i billion for
total money incomes.
Our analysis in Chapter 3 also showed that the sums availa-
ble for taxes and savings will increase proportionately to the
curtailment of civilian spending caused by shortages of con-
sumer goods in a war. If half of the gross national product
should be diverted to military uses in the fiscal year 1943,
without any advance in prices from the levels of March 1942,
the aggregate sums in the hands of individuals available for
savings and taxes would amount to about $48 billion. This
figure compares with our estimate of $31 billion that might
be expected under ordinary peacetime conditions at a total
money income level of billion. Of these $48 billion, we
estimated roughly that some $14 billion would accrue to the
income group above $10,000, about $31billion to the
$1,75o-lo,000 group, and some $3 billion to individuals re-
ceiving less than $1,750.
There is no method of determining a priori what propor-
tion of such sums will go for taxes and what will remain as
savings, because we do not know in advance the structure
and incidence of the tax program. About all we can say with322 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
certainty is that whatever portions of the above aggregates
are not taken by taxation shouldavailable directly or in-
directly for the purchase of government obligations. We can
also be sure that all except a small percentage of such savings
will accrue to the income groups above $1,750, and that, in
all probability, some two-thirds to three-quarters of total
individual savings will lodge in the hands of the $i,Tho-
10,000 group.
As noted in Chapter 3, the figures cited above for the excess
of incomes above expenditures rest upon a series of assump-
tions which may prove widely in error unless anti-inflationary
measures are vigorous and effective. These measures must
include fiscal controls as well as direct controls, and one of
the main purposes of the war finance program should be to
induce and enforce a contraction of civilian spending. If
appropriate financial measures are not adopted, the estimated
excesses of incomes above expenditures may not be realized,
and therefore taxes and borrowing should not be designed
merely to absorb expected excesses of incomes over expendi-
tures as though those excesses would inevitably develop in
the amounts estimated.
From the standpoint of financial policy, it is very important
to observe that the savings remaining in the hands of indi-
viduals may be further increased by the extent to which the
government is successful in inducing individuals to purchase
Savings Bonds and to reduce consumption which would be
detrimental to the war effort. Thus, individual savings, par-
ticularly in wartime, cannot be considered a static and rigid
total. The actual aggregate of savings will vary directly with
the effectiveness of the system of direct controls and of fiscal
measures, including the success with which the government
promotes the sale of its obligations, in reducing consumer
expenditures. It will vary inversely with the amounts taken
from individuals in the form of taxes.
The borrowing problem of the government in relation to
individuals may be defined as one of absorbing as large asGOVERNMENT BORROWING 323
possible a percentage of individual incomes through the sale
of its obligations. These funds may be absorbed by sales
directly to individuals and by sales to institutions in which
part of such savings will lodge. The sales to savings institu-
tions do not present a difficult problem provided that al-
ternative investment opportunites have been substantially
curtailed as a result of the system of direct controls. The pro-
motion of direct sales to individuals is much more difficult,
largely because such savings will accrue in comparatively small
amounts to a vast number of individuals.
In times of peace a relatively high percentage of total sav-
ings accrues to the relatively few individuals in the upper
income groups. These groups also constitute the great bulk
of the individuals who ordinarily are direct purchasers of
investment securities. They are easy to reach because they
are relatively few and have large individual spending power.
In a war they should continue to furnish a substantial market
for government obligations, although higher income taxes
are certain to absorb a larger proportion of their incomes
which might otherwise be saved. From the standpoint of in-
flation control, however, the purchase of government bonds
by the upper income groups is not especially important. As
we have seen in Chapter 3, aggregate consumption expendi-
tures by the group with incomes above $io,ooo would amount
to only about $6.6 billion if all wanted goods were forthcom-
ing at a total money income level of $109 billion, or about
8 per cent of total expenditures. A reduction of expenditures
by this upper group through the purchase of government
obligations, therefore, can be merely a minor factor in di-
verting scarce resources from civilian to military uses.
The $1,75o-lo,000 group affords the most important mar-
ket for the sale of government securities from the standpoint
of both size and the successful promotion of the war effort.
It will probably receive in the fiscal year 1943 aggregate
money incomes of billion. Over half of all consumer
units will fall within this group, and their expenditures, even324 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
if restrained by effective direct controls, will amount to ap-
proximately two-thirds of total consumer expenditures.
To the extent that the excess money incomes of this group
are not absorbed by taxation, great importance attaches to
the desirability of absorbing such funds through the sale of
government securities. To reach the individuals within this
group effectively, however, is not easy. In the first place, aver-
age savings after paying taxes will be less than $i,ooo per
economic unit and will be spread over the 20 to 25 million
economic units which constitute this group. They are so nu-
merous and their income margins above accustomed living
standards so small that the technical problem of assembling
these small rivulets of savings is extremely difficult.
Furthermore, most of the individuals in this middle in-
come group have not previously acquired the habit of pur-
chasing securities directly. In ordinary, times the great bulk
of their savings flows into savings banks, building and loan
associations, and life insurance companies. These savings hab-
its are likely to continue in wartime but the increased volume
of savings it will be necessary to obtain if inflation is to be
checked can probably be achieved only by a very effective
direct selling campaign. The measures taken so far by the
Treasury in marketing Savings Bonds are clearly framed to
aid in solving this problem, but considerably greater vigor,
and perhaps new methods, are likely to be needed.
An important source of individual current savings for the
purchase of government obligations is provided by govern-
mental agencies and trust funds. As of June 30, 1942, United
States governmental agencies and trust funds, excluding the
Exchange Stabilization Fund, held about $io.6 billion of fed-
eral securities. As already indicated, these holdings gained
$2.1 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 1942, com-
pared with an average annual increase of approximately $1.2
billion for the preceding five years.4 About two-thirds of such
holdings in recent years have been concentrated in the hands
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surance Trust Fund, the Postal Savings System, and the Un-
employment Trust Fund.
As the national product expands with war production the
funds at the disposal of many governmental trust funds and
agencies may be expected to increase, even in the absence of
any advance in social security rates and other types of pay-
ments. Consequently these federal agencies will continue to
provide an important and steady market for government
bonds. Since a large if not a major portion of the funds re-
ceived by these agencies are savings, purchases of securities
by them may be considered non-inflationary. Both as a
method of reducing purchasing power and of expanding the
market for government bonds, an increase in such payments
as those required under the Social Security Acts will provide
a valuable check against inflationary tendencies.
As pointed out in Chapter i 2, social security payments are
clearly a form of forced savings. Forced savings devices in-
volve all the compulsion of taxation and, therefore, eliminate
the problem of selling securities; and we have chosen to dis-
cuss this subject in an earlier part of our analysis rather than
as part of the borrowing problem as such. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the technical difficulties involved in selling govern-
ment obligations to the vast number of smaller income re-
cipients, a substantial increase in social security payments,
or some other form of forced savings, may well become a
desirable supplement to voluntary purchases of government
securities by these income groups.
The savings of business concerns, trust funds, eleemosynary
institutions, and other legal entities, including as savings the
unexpended portion of the reserves suck entities set up for
depreciation and other purposes, provide an important mar-
ket for government bonds. Estimates of business savings, and
of reserves set aside by business concerns and other types of
institution, in past years are but three difficulties
impede appraisal of these magnitudes as a potential recurring326 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
market for federal securities. First, the forces which affect the
fortunes of enterprise vary widely as between types of busi-
ness, and the impacts of war will be quite different on one
industry from what they will be on another. Second, it is by
no means clear that business savings rise and fall with the
national product in the way that the savings of individuals
tend to do. Third, although charge-offs to reserve accounts
and business savings pass through the cash account as sums
come into and are paid out of a going concern, there is no
close and immediate connection at any given moment In the
life of a concern between the amount of cash on or
quickly available and the book value of its various reserve
accounts.
On the other hand, so far as savings and charge-offs for
depreciation and other purposes are not converted into tan-
gible assets, either because the necessary commodities are in
short supply or [or other reasons, these sums constitute apo-
tential market for government bonds. Furthermore, the cur-
rent assets of concerns that experience difficulty in obtaining
raw materials and other inventories will more and more be
converted into cash, and no valid reason appears why a sub-
stantial portion should not be invested in federal obligations,
even though such securities are bought through a liquidation
of assets rather than through the accumulation of savings.
Unpublished estimates by members of the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research staff indicate that during 1942
nonfinancial business enterprises might be able to lend the
federal government some $5.7 billion derived from the liqui-
dation of inventories, undistributed earnings, and from de-
preciation accruals in excess of capital expenditures.6 While
those funds made available from the liquidation of inven-
tories would not constitute a recurring market, much if not
all of the unexpended depreciation reserves and undistrib-
uted earnings would. It is estimated that roughly two-thirds
of these sums would be in the hands of business concerns with
total assets of $i million or more, and certainly almost allGOVERNMENT BORROWING 327
would be in the hands of the 50,000 corporations with assets
in excess of $500 thousand.7
Idle Balances
Idle balances are cash holdings or bank accounts in the pos-
session of individuals, business concerns, or other legal en-
tities, which the owners do not expect to spend, at least
immediately, for living or operating expenses. They are pools
of funds, accumulated from past savings, that can be invested.
Since idle balances are accumulations already in existence,
as distinct from savings which accrue from current income,
they constitute a ready if not an immediate market for federal
securities. On the other hand, since they are a reservoir, not
a stream, they are not a recurring market for bond purchases.
J. W. Angell has estimated that idle balances owned by
individuals and business concerns in 1939amountedto $13.4
billion.8 His definition of idle balances differs slightly from
ours and his estimates are somewhat larger than ours would
be. But there is little doubt that in recent years idle balances
have grown substantially. Unpublished estimates by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research indicate that during
1942businessconcerns may hold approximately $1.4billion
of excess cash balances which they could lend to the federal
government.9 These two estimates lead to the conclusion that
much the larger portion of idle balances is held by individ-
uals, trust funds, and nonbusiness organizations, and it isnot
unreasonable to assume that the portion that could be bor-
rowed by the government may amount to as much as $8
billion.
By far the major part of idle balances is in the possession
of families and individuals whose incomes exceed $5,000, and
business concerns or other legal entities whose assets exceed
$500,000.Sincesuch families or consumer units number
about 950,000,10andsince there are roughly 50,000 such busi-
ness concerns, these funds are concentrated in relatively few328 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
hands; hence to absorb them through the sale of securities is
relatively simple. They can most effectively be made available
to the government by utilizing the forms of securities and
merchandising methods by which the savings of the middle
and upper income brackets are reached.
Exchanging idle balances for government obligations tends
to be inflationary, unless offset by increased savings accrued
in an effort to rebuild such balances or by a reduction in
commercial bank credit. As soon as the government receives
these monies it spends them, whereas as long as the balances
were kept idle they did not enter the stream of expenditures,
except to the extent th,at they created additional bank credit,
and they therefore influenced prices little. Thus, the activa-
tion of idle balances by government security purchases has
usually an expansionary effect similar to any tendency that
accelerates the velocity of circulation.
Commercial Bank Credit
The sale of government bonds to commercial banks does not
necessarily create an inflationary influence. So far as current
savings, either individual or corporate, are left on deposit with
commercial banks, the effect of converting them into govern-
ment bond purchases will not be inflationary. On the other
hand, the purchase of such bonds directly by an individual
may create bank credit. During the first World War the sale
of Liberty Bonds was greatly stimulated by the slogan, 'Bor-
row and Buy'. Individuals were persuaded to borrow funds
from banks and give government obligations as security. In
this manner, practically the same additional credit was cre-
ated as if the bonds had been purchased directly by the banks
themselves.
Nevertheless, so far as bonds are not absorbed by current
savings or idle balances they will of necessity be absorbed
through the creation of deposits by commercial banks; that
is, by an expansion of bank credit. Commercial banks can andGOVERNMENT BORROWING 329
do acquire government obligations through various transac-
tions. They purchase bonds from individuals and bankers,
from the Federal Reserve Banks, and directly from the Treas-
ury, paying in cash, from excess reserves, with the proceeds
received from liquidation of an asset or by borrowing from
the Reserve Banks, and with newly created deposits credited
to the Treasury. Each type of transaction affects the credit
structure somewhat differently. But the type used in the great
majority of purchases during wartime is the purchase by the
banks of new debt directly from the Treasury through the
creation of bank credit. Such credit is new purchasing power,
additional to what existed before the transaction, and when
it is spent by the government, with the consequent stimulat-
ing effects on prices, it is redeposited by the recipients in the
banking system and remains outstanding, available for fur-
ther spending by the owners.
New bank credit is the ultimate market for new federal
debt, though not in the sense of time. Since the Treasury, as
it were, can easily 'find' the banks, since the banks can buy
government bonds simply by crediting the Treasury with the
purchase price, and since, ordinarily, this process can be re-
peated with considerable facility, the banking system is the
readiest market for federal obligations, and it takes off the
market a larger or smaller proportion of all new issues legally
available to it.
In ordinary times the extent to which the commercial
banking system can absorb government bonds is looked upon
as being limited by the reserve position of the banks and the
ratio of their capital funds to their total assets. However,
these are not ordinary times. The reserve position of the
banks can be altered by governmental regulation, as can, in
less degree, their capital ratios, through the values placed by
the examining authorities on the government bonds in their
portfolios and in other ways. Hence it may not be realistic to
view these factors, ordinarily of great importance, as of much
significance in wartime.330 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
When the government sells a bond to any given purchaser,
it cannot be certain that the purchase funds have stemmed
from current savings, from idle balances, or from the creation
of commercial bank credit. In other words, it cannot be sure
whether the effect of any particular purchase will be inflation-
ary or non-inflationary. Under certain circumstances, sales to
a commercial bank may be non-inflationary, while sales to
individuals may be inflationary. Nevertheless, we know that
purchases of government securities by commercial banks are
much more likely to inflationary effects than purchases
by individuals. Furthermore, we know that, if bond purchases
by commercial banks are sufficiently large, the effects are cer-
tain to be inflationary. A sound borrowing program for war-
time must be constructed around this basic fact.
If inflationary tendencies are to be avoided, the Treasury's
objective must be to maximize bond sales to individuals and
nonfinancial institutions, and to minimize sales to commer-
cial banks. No inflationary dangers exist in selling to com-
mercial banks government obligations in an amount that
does not exceed deposits created by current savings. The dan-
ger arises largely because of the ease and cheapness
which commercial banks can absorb an almost unlimited vol-
ume of government obligations by creating additional bank
credit.
Theoretically, the current savings, to say nothing of idle
balances, owned by individuals and institutions should be
sufficient to meet all the borrowing requirements of the gov-
ernment. Actually, the government will have great difficulty
in tapping even a major part of the very large surplus spend-
ing power owned by the middle and lower income groups.
The expense and difficulty of absorbing such funds contrast
with the ease and cheapness of borrowing directly from com-
mercial banks. Unless resort is had to compulsory savings
schemes, a primary consideration of the government must be
to develop adequate technical and organizational plans to
cope with the problem of reaching these two groups.GOVERNMENT BORROWING 331
3 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING
Such technical matters as the forms and methods used by the
Treasury in borrowing the money necessary for the prosecu-
tion of the war, and the timing and sequence of the methods,
especially if some prove to be such as may be described as
innovations, will very greatly influence the amount the gov-
ernment can borrow from each source. Moreover, the eco-
nomic consequences, and the form and magnitude of the
administrative problems which during and after the war will
bulk large both in the management of the public debt and in
the broader field of fiscal policy will be intimately affected by
the method. In short, not only the amount borrowed and the
sources tapped, but also the way in which the money is bor-
rowed, is of great economic and social consequence.
Shall the maturities of the issues be short, as is the case with
Treasury Bills, or long, as is the case with the longest bonds?
Shall the government rely on the interest rate as the chief
inducement, or on the form of selling campaign? Shall the
interest be paid periodically in cash, as is the case with most
of the issues comprising the 'public marketable supply' of
debt, or accrued during the life of the obligation, as is the
case with Treasury Bills and '\'VarSavingsBonds? Shall the
bonds be freely transferable, or redeemable by the holder on
demand? If so, what shall be the schedule of redemption
values? Shall the bonds be sold through competitive bidding,
as are Treasury Bills; shall they be sold at regular or irregu-
lar intervals, as are most issues of Treasury Bonds and Notes,
or shall they be 'on tap', as are War Savings Bonds? What
shall be the denominations for each issue?
Shall some of the offerings be restricted to certain types of
buyer, as are some issues now? What privileges with respect
to conversion, callability, and other features shall be attached
to some of or all the offerings? To what extent shall the pro-
visions of one issue be designed to appeal to one type of buyer
rather than another, and how often shall the same type of332 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
buyer be relied upon as the chief purchaser? To what extent
shall the purchase of the bonds be voluntary, to what extent
shall highly organized sales campaigns put pressure upon indi-
viduals to buy, and by what steps shall 'compulsory saving',
either of the type now required by the Social Security Acts
or of other types, be expanded or initiated? These are the
technical questions which confront the Treasury and Con-
gress. The answers will not only largely determine the char-
acter of the borrowing program during hostilities, but will
also greatly affect fiscal problems for at least a generation
after the war.
One of the most important questions is: To what extent
shall long term obligations, obligations with maturities of
five years or more, be utilized, and to what extent short term
debt?
Long term bonds lessen the need for frequent refunding
of maturing issues. So far as the money borrowed during the
war is borrowed on such terms as not to require its repayment
or refunding until after the cessation of hostilities, the war-
time financing task of the Treasury will be reduced. And so
far as such bonds are sold to buyers who will not resell dur-
ing hostilities, or are sold in such a way that the purchaser's
ability to resell is restricted or eliminated, the maintenance
of an orderly market for government debt, free from disturb-
ing fluctuations, whether occasioned by military or other de-
velopments, is easier. Purchases from idle balances and some
portion of the purchases from savings of persons and institu-
tions and by commercial banks are less likely to be resold
than purchases from other sources, even in the absence of
restrictions on negotiability. At present War Savings Bonds
are redeemable but not negotiable; tax certificates are not
negotiable, but can be used to pay federal income taxes; and
as the war progresses, it may well prove desirable to restrict
the negotiability of other issues, or to devise new types of
non-negotiable issues possessing special qualities.
At present, long term borrowing requires a higher interestGOVERNMENT BORROWING 333
rate than short term. In a period of unusually low interest
rates, this disparity may reflect the greater risk purchasers are
thought to incur mainly through the possibility of a rise in
interest rates during the life of the bond, and the consequent
depreciation in its value. Under existing conditions, however,
the disparity may also reflect the exceptional desire for liquid-
ity and the fear of inflatiOnary effects upon long term con-
tracts. From the viewpoint of the government, the greater
interest cost is the chief disadvantage to long term borrowing.
Against the greater ease and lower interest rates of short term
borrowing must be set the fact that in a period of deficit
financing short term obligations must continually •be re-
funded. In the event that the government adopts or is forced
into a policy of short term borrowing its refunding problem
cumulates rapidly.
In handling a series of refundings the government incurs
two types of risk. First, interest rates may rise and it may be
necessary to refund the debt at a higher rate of interest. Con-
ceivably, it may even become necessary to refund at con tinu-
ally rising rates. Second, as noted earlier, to be able to borrow
new money the government must always satisfy existing cred-
itors as their debts fall due; consequently, the larger the vol-
ume of short dated debt and the more often maturities fall
due, the more the financial stability of the government de-
pends upon the satisfaction of its creditors. Each refunding
affords an opportunity to creditors to request new terms, and
as refundings become larger and more frequent, satisfaction
of creditors becomes a matter of great consequence. For if
even one refunding fails, the borrowing of additional new
money becomes difficult. Hence, in order to minimize an im-
portant hazard of war finance continuous effort should be
made to borrow as much money on long term as is conven-
iently possible, and short term debt, which as a matter of
expediency must be incurred to some extent, should be re-
funded into long term obligations sufficiently often to keep
the refunding task within manageable proportions.334 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
The particular provisions attached to government loans,
such as the denominations of the bonds, their degree of ne-
gotiability, the method of interest payment, the call and
conversion provisions, and even in considerable degree the
interest paid and the length of maturity, are in many ways
analogous to the problems of packaging) and are to be ap-
praised in much the same way as the packaging of any other
product, such as soap or breakfast food. Packaging and other
merchandising methods are among the main aids to the
seller in making his product acceptable tothe buying
public; and their importance is all the greater when, as in
the case of government bonds, the quality of the merchandise
is beyond question. Since in selling its bonds the government
must appeal to types of investors very different in respect of
their economic status, buying habits, and motives, there are
sound reasons, on the grounds of both economic theory and
sales technique, for the government to differentiate among
purchasers. The forms of individual bond issues, and the sales
methods used for each, must be appraised with reference to
the type of investors the government is seeking to induce to
purchase federal securities.
The sale of federal bonds to governmental agencies and
trust funds of course presents no problem. For the most part
these agencies are required by law to invest their funds in
government securities, and suitable terms can be and largely
are agreed upon by the Treasury and the agency in question.
Current savings of persons and business concerns and the
liquidation of assets by business firms constitute a large and
recurring market for federal obligations, and one that can be
expanded through patriotic appeals. Every effort should be
made to exploit this market to the full, and the organizations
and types of securities used to tap these funds can also be
used to absorb idle balances.
In the conversion of savings, idle balances, and the pro-
ceeds of liquidated business assets into federal debt, the sell-
ing methods and organization may be more important thanGOVERNMENT BORROWING 335
the interest rate. For the sale of small denomination bonds
the methods currently being developed by the Treasury are
well devised. The use of department stores, post offices, and
commercial and savings banks as outlets for government
bonds is an effort in the right direction but much more vig-
orous and direct selling methods are likely to be necessary
in order to raise the needed funds from individuals.
Idle balances and current savings may best be exchanged
for securities essentially similar to War Savings Bonds;
namely, into bonds of at least five years' maturity, into bonds
possessing either deferred negotiability, or redeemability but
not negotiability, and into bonds that do not yield any in-
come through redeemable coupons, but accrue their inter-
est.'1 Such bonds could.be placed 'on tap,' and their denomi-
nations range from 25centsto $i,00o.
Commercial banks, on the other hand, are typically buyers
of short term government securities, chiefly with maturities
of less than five years. This particular situation must be rec-
ognized by the Treasury in the type of security it offers for
purchase by these institutions. Nevertheless, some fair balance
should be struck between the desire of the banks to minimize
their capital risks and the need of the Treasury to avoid an
unmanageable refunding task which could follow the crea-
tion of too large a volume of short dated maturities.
Recognition of the special problems of the banks serves to
emphasize the basic objective of war borrowing: that as much
money as possible should be borrowed outside the banks on
longer term maturities, not only to keep the refunding task
within manageable proportions, but also and more funda-
mentally in order to avoid an inflationary expansion of bank
deposits.336 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
NOTES




Public marketable issues 50,574
Nonmarketable issues 13,511
Special issues 7,885
Matureddebt on which interest has ceased g8
Debt bearing no interest 356
Total 72,424
SOURCE: Treasury Department, press release, July 2, 1942.
2 Treasury Department, press release, July 2, 1942.
3 Ibid., Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 95, 99.
4 Ibid., p. 107.
5 See Simon Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition, 1919—1938(Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1941), particularly Ch. 4, 7, 10.
6 These estimates, prepared by S. S. Alexander, A. R. Koch, and Carl Kaysen
of the Financial Research Staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research
in connection with the investigation of Changes in the Financial Require-
ments of Business Enterprises, are in detail:
BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS
From liquidation of inventories minus the retirement of notes
payable 2.'7
From undistributed earnings
From depreciation accruals in excess of capital expenditures i
Total 5.7
7 Estimate based on data in Economic Prologue, T.N.E.G. Hearings, pp.
229-30.
8lnvestment and Business Cycles (McGraw-Hill, 1941), Appendix II, pp.
337-40.
9 Also prepared by S. S. Alexander, A. R. Koch, and Carl Kaysen.
10 Who Pays the Taxes, T.N.E.C. Monograph 3, p. 42.
11 By deferred negotiability is meant a security non-negotiable for some
period such as five years subsequent to the purchase date, but redeemable
during this interval.